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It is a central aspect of our ordinary concept of time that history
unfolds and events come into being. It is only natural to take this
seriously. However, it is notoriously difficult to explain further what
this ‘becoming’ consists in, or even to show that the notion is consis-
tent at all.
In this article I first argue that the idea of a global temporal ordering,
involving a succession of cosmic nows, is not indispensable for our con-
cept of time. Our experience does not support the existence of global
simultaneity and arguments from modern physics further support the
conclusion that time should not be seen as a succession of cosmic nows.
Accordingly, I propose that if we want to make sense of becoming we
should attempt to interpret it as something purely local. Second, I ad-
dress the question of what this local becoming consists in. I maintain
that processes of becoming are nothing but the successive happening
of events, and that this happening of events consists entirely in the
occurring of these events at their own spacetime locations. This leads
to a consistent view of becoming, which is applicable even to rather
pathological spacetimes.
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1 Simultaneity and the Now
Untutored intuition sees an inextricable bond between time and global simul-
taneity: time is a succession of cosmic nows. Each such ‘now’ extends over
the whole universe, connecting simultaneous events. Part of this intuition is
the supposed self-evidence of the meaning of statements about distant simul-
taneity. However, in 1905 Einstein famously subjected this intuitive picture
to a drastic epistemological critique. He started by conceding [8] that there
cannot be any dispute about whether coinciding events are simultaneous.
But, Einstein pointed out, for events that do not spatiotemporally coincide
the meaning of simultaneity is not so obvious. The reason is that we do not
have immediate empirical access to the temporal relations between events
that take place at a distance from each other—at least, not in the cases in
which these events are outside each other’s sphere of causal influence. We
ourselves are more or less spatially localized and this, together with the fact
that information cannot travel faster than light, implies that at any instant
in our lives there are events that can be influenced by us (in the future light-
cone), events that can influence us (in the past lightcone), but many more
events that are not within causal reach at all. Events in the future and past
lightcones are unambiguously temporally ordered with respect to the event
at their apex (indeed, we could have veridical memories of all past lightcone
events, and there could be memories of the apex event everywhere in the fu-
ture lightcone); but what about all the other events, outside the two cones?
Notoriously, Einstein concluded that in the case of such distant events their
temporal order with respect to us, and in particular simultaneity, must be
established by definition. His concrete proposal for establishing simultaneity
was that two clocks that rest with respect to each other can be taken to be
in synchrony if a light signal that leaves clock A at time t0 (as indicated on
A) and is reflected at clock B when B’s hands indicate t1, arrives back at A
at local A-time 2t1− t0. In other words, the event at A halfway between the
emission of the signal and its return is taken to be simultaneous with the re-
flection of the light at B. The arbitrary aspect typical of definitions, according
to Einstein, is that it has to be stipulated that light going from A to B and
back again needs equal amounts of time in the two directions (in other words,
that the speed of light is direction independent). This definition is equivalent
to taking ² = 1/2 in Reichenbach’s famous formula t1 = t0 + ²(t2 − t0) [19].
In the spirit of Einstein’s 1905 discussion, Reichenbach and many others
after him have argued that this value of ², and therefore which events are
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regarded as being simultaneous, is purely a matter of convention. The justi-
fication of this view is that the consistent use of any other value of ² (with
0 < ² < 1) leads to a description that is empirically equivalent to the stan-
dard one (² = 1/2). Indeed, distant simultaneous events, whatever the value
of ² that is taken for the definition of simultaneity (as long as 0 < ² < 1),
have spacelike separation with respect to us, so that we cannot reach them
by signals and cannot be reached from them. In other words, the definition
of simultaneity only pertains to what lies outside our past and future light-
cones and can therefore have no influence on the content of our observations.
Relativistic theories (in which the speed of light is the maximum speed of
information transfer) are therefore empirically equivalent to their variants
with ² 6= 1/2.
It is important to note that there are two ingredients in this epistemolog-
ical critique of the relevance of simultaneity. First, there is the assumption
that there is no action at a distance: signals cannot propagate faster than
with the speed of light c. Second, it is assumed that observation is a local
process. The whole conventionality argument is based on the presumption
that the observation event can be represented by the apex of a lightcone, i.e.,
a spacetime point.
If observations instead are taken to correspond to extended regions in
spacetime, it could legitimately be asked whether simultaneity plays a role
in determining the outcome of the observation within such regions; in which
case simultaneity on this local level would not be conventional. It seems more
plausible to suppose that an observation is a process of finite spatiotemporal
extension that does not depend on simultaneity within the region of obser-
vation (so that the content of the observation supervenes directly on the
collection of events within the spacetime region of the observation). However
this is taken to be, the fact remains that the ‘observation spacetime region’
is of very limited extent—its spatial dimensions should certainly not exceed
that of the human body. Our perceptual apparatus, memory, etc., are all
more or less localized. So regardless of the status of local simultaneity, in the
very small, the way simultaneity is assigned outside this limited region of ob-
servation plays no role for the content of observation. The representation of
an observation by a point-event is therefore a justified approximation, espe-
cially in the context of the cosmological considerations we shall be concerned
with in this article. In the arguments we shall put forward, this (quasi-)local
character of observation will play an important role.
In spite of the argumentation about the irrelevance of simultaneity for
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what we observe, the claim that simultaneity in special relativity is merely
conventional is controversial. The reason is that the conventionality thesis
is epistemologically inspired, and therefore more or less automatically suspi-
cious from a realist point of view. Especially after Malament’s proof [13] that
the ² = 1/2 relation is the only plausible equivalence relation between events
that can be defined from the 4-geometry of Minkowski spacetime and a given
inertial worldline, the tide seems to have turned against Reichenbach and his
followers. I will later come back to Malament’s argument, which is ontolog-
ical rather than epistemological. But whatever one’s attitude with respect
to the conventionality thesis, it has to be admitted that its two premises,
namely that there is a maximum signal speed and that observation is local,
lead to the conclusion that choosing ² 6= 1/2 makes no difference for obser-
vational results. This conclusion stands, whether or not one accepts it as a
good argument for the conventionality thesis. Local observations—the ex-
periences of localized observers—are invariant under different choices of the
value of ² in the same way as they are invariant under different choices of
coordinate systems. In particular, it follows that those human experiences
that suggest that time flows are invariant under different choices of ².
This observation undermines the idea that our direct experiences of time,
passage, and becoming provide support for the idea that there are cosmic
nows, whose succession determines the flow of time. We do not need a suc-
cession of a definite set of global simultaneity hyperplanes in order to accom-
modate our experience. For it follows from what was just said not only that
completely different choices of such hyperplanes lead to the same local expe-
riences,1 but even that we do not have to bother about global simultaneity
at all. If we decided to scrap the term ‘simultaneity’ from our theoretical vo-
cabulary, no problem would arise for doing justice to our observations. This
ties in with the fact that relativistic theories can be given completely local
formulations—simultaneity plays no role in the dynamical laws of relativity
theory. Clearly then, our direct time experience does not provide epistemo-
logical warrant for the existence of a global now and global becoming. This
line of reasoning parallels Einstein’s 1905 argument that our local experience
does not support the classical notion of absolute simultaneity.
1We could also take ² position and direction dependent without observational differ-




So, if arguments based on our direct awareness of the flow of time were
the only ones at our disposal, we might already now deny the relevance of
global simultaneity for our conceptions of time and becoming. However, it
would be too quick to think that limitations of our means of observation, in
this case the fact that we are restricted to the observation of local events,
imply strict bounds for our conceptions about the structure of the world.
There may be good theoretical reasons for assuming the existence of things
or structures we do not have direct observational access to. Indeed, the fact
that our observations take place in a restricted spacetime region have not
prevented us from theorizing about spacetime as a whole—like Minkowski
spacetime in special relativity. Now, in the context of Minkowski spacetime
there is a well-known theoretical argument designed to show that there exists
exactly one global equivalence relation that meets natural requirements to
be imposed on the concept of simultaneity relative to an observer, namely
the relation of Minkowski orthogonality with respect to the worldline of this
observer [13]. This simultaneity relation is built into Minkowski spacetime, in
the sense that it is completely definable from the Minkowski metric (plus the
specification of the worldline in question). If one takes a realist stance with
respect to Minkowski spacetime—and we do not want to argue against such
a realist position here—this global simultaneity therefore appears to have a
clear ontological grounding. Is it not natural to assume that this particular
simultaneity relation fixes the successive instants in the history of the world,
which come into being one after another?
Actually, it is misleading to state that the above argument leads to a
simultaneity relation that is built into Minkowski spacetime and therefore
must be assumed to exist as soon as the existence of Minkowski spacetime
itself is accepted. As already mentioned, the relation in question is defined
with respect to worldlines. Now, it may be maintained that as a mathe-
matical fact all possible worldlines (also curved ones) exist in Minkowski
spacetime, together with the associated orthogonality hyperplanes at each of
their points. This, however, clearly does not lead to one definite notion of si-
multaneity. Instead it is a vast collection of simultaneities whose existence is
warranted by the existence of Minkowski spacetime, and this collection does
not yield one sensible notion of global temporal succession. We must appar-
ently specify which worldlines are privileged and relevant for simultaneity.
This is tantamount to augmenting the structure of Minkowski spacetime.
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Our own worldlines seem prime candidates for the required additional
structure. After all, we are the ones who come up with these intuitions
about global becoming and successive cosmic nows, so it appears reasonable
to suppose that the simultaneity that is involved is simultaneity relative to us.
However, our worldlines are complicated: we take part in the annual and daily
motion of the Earth and are therefore not moving inertially. Our situation is
very nearly that of inhabitants of a rotating system in Minkowski spacetime.
The study of the properties of time in rotating systems is therefore relevant
for the question of whether the simultaneity related to actual observers leads
to a global now.
The study of rotating frames of reference played an important role in
Einstein’s discovery of general relativity [24]. Time in these frames exhibits
a structure that is also important from a modern foundational point of view
[3, 5]. The most significant point for our present discussion is that local
Einstein synchrony (² = 1/2) in a rotating system does not extend to a
consistent global definition of simultaneity. Each observer on a rotating disc
can locally apply the Einstein definition, but the so-defined local nows do
not combine into one hypersurface. Therefore, orthogonality with respect
to rotating worldlines cannot serve the purpose of defining a succession of
global Nows.
This can be seen easily by considering observers who are positioned along
the edge of a rotating disc (and who are at rest with respect to the disc).
Synchronizing along the edge with ² = 1/2 leads to a discrepancy, a time
gap, upon returning to the initial position. For imagine the circle that forms
the edge to be folded out into a straight line. The spacetime diagram of Fig.
1 represents the uniformly moving observers sitting along this line, together
with their local ² = 1/2 synchrony hyperplanes. It is evident that the initial
and final events cannot coincide when the line is folded back into a circle:
there is a time gap. More generally, local Einstein simultaneity with respect
to worldlines with accelerations that involve rotations cannot lead to a global
equal time hypersurface (this is a consequence of Frobenius’s theorem [25,
Appendix B.3]).
So, if we accept that Einstein simultaneity with respect to worldlines
enjoys a special status and is the candidate par excellence for grounding
an objective Now, we face the disappointing result that this notion cannot
define a global now in the case of our own worldlines of rotating Earthlings,
or the worldlines of arbitrary other rotating systems. However, in view of the






Figure 1: Standard synchrony along a rotating circle (x1 = x2), folded out
into a line.
and other actually existing physical systems are in a state of acceleration
that involves rotation. That means that Einstein simultaneity with respect
to actually materialized worldlines will quite generally not lead to a global
definition of simultaneity.
Therefore, nows of global becoming cannot be fixed by Einstein simul-
taneity with respect to worldlines in Minkowski spacetime that are realistic
representations of actual material worldlines.2 Special relativistic cosmic
nows must clearly be related to a particular choice of non-materialized par-
allel timelike geodesics (actually, a continuous set of them that completely
fills up spacetime, i.e., a congruence). Such a congruence defines a frame
of reference and the unique Einstein simultaneity associated with it. But
which congruence of inertial worldlines should be chosen? The spatiotempo-
ral structure of Minkowski spacetime does not single out any set of parallel
geodesics from the infinitely many defined in it—this is one way of formu-
lating the relativity postulate, which says that all frames are equivalent. So
if we are not going to refer to the actual material worldlines in the universe,
but only to the spacetime structure itself, we have insufficient resources to fix
a unique set of global nows. If we do attempt to rely on the actual material
worldlines, however, we will not succeed in defining global nows at all.
In the context of Minkowski spacetime the project of defining a global
notion of becoming is therefore hopeless. We could of course just choose
some foliation of Minkowski spacetime and declare it to realize universal
2One may object that it does not make sense at all to represent the actual universe
by means of special relativity. However, Minkowski spacetime provides an approximation
to general relativistic spacetimes that is quite good even for large spatiotemporal regions.
But see the next section for an assessment of the situation in general relativity.
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nows. But these nows would not play any role in our time experience, since
our experience is local and does not depend on stipulations about the time
coordinates to be assigned to space-like separated events. Moreover, such a
global now would not play any role in the formulation of physical theory. Fi-
nally, it would not be definable from Minkowski spacetime structure without
the addition of arbitrary elements. It would be bad metaphysics to opt for
something as gratuitous as that.
But there may be a way out. The best available theory of our actual
universe is not special relativity with its highly symmetrical flat Minkowski
spacetime but general relativity. Perhaps this theory offers better prospects
for global becoming.
3 Non-rotating universes
In completely generic general-relativistic spacetimes the situation is worse
rather than better. There are solutions of the Einstein field equations that
cannot be sliced up at all by means of spacelike hypersurfaces. This feature
of general relativity, and its possible consequences for the theory of time,
have become notorious since Go¨del’s seminal work [9, 10]. Go¨del found so-
lutions of the field equations in which there are closed timelike curves (it is
characteristic of these Go¨del spacetimes that the matter in them possesses a
net rotation). It is clear that there can be no linear ordering of global Nows
and therefore no global linear flow in universes in which worldlines bend back
into their past. So if we take the view that the essential features of time are
those that are solely determined by the Einstein equations—in other words,
that the essential features of time are those that are present in all models of
the theory—it follows that global linear flow cannot be such a feature: there
are solutions of the Einstein equations without it.3
In his ‘Reply to Criticisms’ Einstein remarked about the Go¨del universes:
“It will be interesting to weigh whether these are not to be excluded on
3I take it that Go¨del’s argumentation is directed against the idea that it is an es-
sential characteristic of time that it flows linearly ; that becoming in this sense exists.
Although Go¨del’s formulation is not quite unambiguous, I think that this is the only way
his argument makes sense (compare [7, pp. 194-200]). The form of Go¨del’s argument as
I understand it then is: Time is usually said to be different from space because it flows
from the distant past to the distant future; but in some solutions there is time without
such flow being possible; flow can therefore not be an essential, defining characteristic of
time.
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physical grounds” [23, p. 688]. In other words, Einstein suggested that not
all mathematically correct solutions of the general relativistic field equations
may represent physically possible worlds. If the class of possible worlds is
indeed taken to be smaller than the full set of mathematical models satisfying
the general relativistic field equations, then in this smaller set of ‘physical
solutions’ the shared properties of time might include the total ordering that
is needed for Go¨del’s global becoming.4
The proposal not to take into account Go¨del type solutions of the Ein-
stein equations may seem ad hoc. However, on second thought it is perhaps
not implausible. First of all, observational evidence indicates that our own
universe is not rotating[22]. Other possible general relativistic worlds, in
which strange Go¨delian things happen, exist as far as we know only on pa-
per. That by itself, however, is no obstacle for considering them relevant for
an analysis of the concept of time based on our best physical theory. But
it should be noted that general relativity with its usual scope may not be
the only contender here. Already in the case of classical particle mechanics
there is a serious rival for Newtonian mechanics in the case of non-rotating
universes, and the situation seems similar in relativity theory. For those so-
lutions of the classical Newtonian equations of particle motion in which there
is no net particle rotation, it is possible to formulate a completely relational,
Leibnizean particle mechanics that is empirically equivalent (for these cases
with no net rotation) to Newtonian classical mechanics [11]. In this rela-
tional classical theory only mutual distances and relative orientations of the
particles occur—there is no need for absolute space. As just mentioned, our
universe actually appears to be non-rotating. So, as a piece of counterfactual
4This suggestion could alternatively be couched in terms of essential versus contingent
properties of time. As just mentioned, Go¨del’s argument for the ‘ideality’ of time, as he
puts it, relies on the idea that if time ‘objectively lapses’ (if there is objective becoming),
this should be an essential property of time, instantiated in all possible worlds. The
Go¨del universes are then relevant as counterexamples. If the set of possible worlds is
restricted so as to exclude Go¨del universes, objective passage may regain its status as an
essential attribute of time. As a limiting situation we could consider taking only our own
universe as possible: then everything existing in our world would exist necessarily. The
actual characteristics of time in our world would thus by definition also be essential. This
seems a too drastic curtailment of the scope of physical theory and a trivialization of the
distinction between the essential and the contingent, however. Even if we are convinced
that there is actually only one universe and if we are strict empiricists, it makes sense to
conceptually distinguish between the merely contingent and the essential, on the basis of
the properties of (a set of) models of our theories.
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history, we could speculate about what the history of mechanics would have
been if Newton had proposed this relational theory instead of his actual the-
ory involving absolute space. In the relational version of particle mechanics
it is a built-in and law-like feature that there is no net rotation (there is
no background with respect to which such a global rotation could even be
defined). Only non-rotating universes are therefore possible according to this
theory. In other words, the lack of rotation is essential and necessary within
this theoretical framework. In our counterfactual history, this feature could
then have been carried over to the conceptual framework of an alternative
version of general relativity theory. Indeed, it can be shown that general
relativity accommodates Leibnizean and Machian desiderata if one restricts
the set of allowed solutions to non-rotating closed universes [12]. So one can
imagine an alternative course of history in which the notion of a net rotation
of the matter in the universe would never have made sense as a physical pos-
sibility. Such an absence of rotation is conducive to the existence of global
nows, as we already saw, and it excludes Go¨del universes. If we go on to
exclude exotic possibilities like wormholes in spacetime that give access to
the past, this could lead to spacetimes that allow global foliations as the only
physical possibilities.
Let us go along with this line of reasoning, and assume that physically
possible universes (of which our universe is one) do not rotate on an as-
tronomical scale and do not contain closed timelike worldlines. This allows
[14] the introduction of a foliation of spacetime into a linearly ordered set
of three-dimensional spaces, each space being orthogonal to the worldlines
representing the mean motion of matter.5 At first sight this possibility seems
to decide the issue: in all physically possible universes it could be said “that
reality consists of an infinity of layers of ‘now’ which come into existence
successively” [9].
However, Go¨del himself already expressed reservations about this way
5There may also exist other ways of defining a global time. In particular, in spatially
homogeneous cosmologies three-dimensional spaces of constant mass density may foliate
the spacetime. Often this does not yield something new, because these homogeneity
spaces are in many models orthogonal to the worldlines as well; but there exist also
cosmological models in which the homogeneity condition and the orthogonality condition
lead to different foliations [1, Sec.3.3]. We focus on the orthogonality criterion because it
matches the special relativistic notion of simultaneity, which appears a natural requirement
in view of the indistinguishability between special and general relativity on the local scale.
But the arguments against global becoming to be put forward below will also work against
the homogeneity definition.
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of constructing a Now (without pressing the point). He observed “that the
procedure described above gives only an approximate definition of an absolute
time. No doubt it is possible to refine the procedure so as to obtain a precise
definition, but perhaps only by introducing more or less arbitrary elements
(such as, e.g., the size of the regions or the weight function to be used in the
computation of the mean motion of matter). It is doubtful whether there
exists a precise definition which has so great merits, that there would be
sufficient reason to consider exactly the time thus obtained as the true one.”
Consider, to make Go¨del’s worry clear, the Robertson-Walker solutions
of the field equations. These are the solutions that are found if spatial ho-
mogeneity and isotropy are imposed. It is possible to define a global time t
in them (t is the argument of the scale factor occurring in the standard way
of writing the solutions). The equal-t hypersurfaces are orthogonal to the
worldlines of matter—matter is at rest in these hypersurfaces (in which the
matter density is constant). The total spacetime can thus be represented as
a stack of equal-time hypersurfaces, a succession of three-dimensional spaces
each of which belongs to one value of t. This cosmic time t thus seems very
well suited to make the notion of global becoming more precise.
Though the Robertson-Walker metric is often used as a representation of
our own universe, our universe is obviously not homogeneous and isotropic.
It is only when we average over very large spatial regions that the distribu-
tion of matter in the actual universe appears to approximate homogeneity and
isotropy. That means that only if we leave small scale details out of consider-
ation, our universe can be approximated by a model of the Robertson-Walker
type. Now, we could define equal-t hypersurfaces in our actual universe as
surfaces that are orthogonal to the average mass distribution that we can
calculate by coarse graining over large volumes. But the result of this pro-
cedure depends on the details of the averaging process and the size of the
regions considered. One would expect that the conformity to a Robertson-
Walker spacetime becomes better when the sizes of the regions over which
the averaging takes place become bigger (though it is not really certain that
the homogeneity and isotropy assumption will be satisfied in a limiting situ-
ation, or even that there is a well-defined limiting situation), but as long as
the averages are taken over finite regions homogeneity will not be complete
and will vary with the sizes of the volumes. Accordingly, the equal-t hyper-
surface that is found will be different depending on the choices we make for
the averaging procedure. So there is arbitrariness in the definition of the
global time t, comparable to the arbitrariness in choosing one set of paral-
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lel inertial worldlines over another in Minkowski spacetime. However, if we
concentrate not on the imaginary worldlines of smeared out matter but go
to the detailed scale of real, actually existing worldlines, we encounter the
same problems as when we attempted to do this in Minkowski spacetime: in
general these actual worldlines will be rotating and there will be no global
simultaneity hyperplane orthogonal to even a small subset of them (like our
own worldlines on Earth). It is obvious that the above-mentioned empirical
fact of a vanishing rotation in our universe can only refer to the net rotation,
found by averaging on a cosmic scale: on a small scale, rotation is present
everywhere around us.
As Go¨del stated, in order to arrive at a notion that has a chance of repre-
senting objective global time flow one should first of all provide an unambigu-
ous definition of global time. What we have just seen is that it is impossible
to arrive at such a definition if we attempt to extend special relativistic lo-
cal simultaneity defined with respect to actual worldlines in our universe.
Only in very special highly symmetrical cosmologies do hypersurfaces exist
that can plausibly be considered to realize such uniquely determined cos-
mic instants. As soon as we turn to realistic, asymmetrical, cosmological
models the definition of such hypersurfaces comes to depend on statistical
considerations and is no longer unique.
More generally, even if we forget about the orthogonality condition, in
asymmetrical spacetimes6 that admit foliation at all no unique foliations can
be singled out on the basis of the spacetime geometry [1, pp. 264-265]. Many
slicings of spacetime are generally possible, none of them deserving the label
‘fundamental’.
However, what we would like, in Go¨del’s words, is a definition that “has
so great merits, that there would be sufficient reason to consider exactly the
time thus obtained as the true one”. It will not do to just stipulate that
one or another way of cutting up spacetime in a series of non-overlapping
three-dimensional spaces furnishes a succession of nows. In particular, what
we would like to have is a foliation of spacetime that does explanatory work
with respect to our experience of time and our intuition of time flow. That,
however, appears an unattainable goal. The arbitrariness of foliations just
discussed basically derives from the fact that the physical laws have a local
character and do not need a notion of simultaneity for their formulation at
all. That is the reason that we were driven to consider contingent, fact-
6Spacetimes without symmetry actually lie dense in the total space of solutions
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like circumstances as a basis for possible definitions. But such contingent
circumstances, pertaining as they do to far-away conditions in the universe
at large, are completely irrelevant to our local experience. We can conclude
that global time plays no role at all in our time experience.
This general diagnosis is not changed by the various proposals that have
been made to use foliations that lead to simplifications of the equations in the
constrained Hamiltonian formalism of GRT, like those that take the mean
extrinsic curvature of hyperplanes as the time parameter. The constrained
Hamiltonian formalism itself characterizes these choices as choices of a par-
ticular gauge [25, Appendix E], which is tantamount to saying that nothing
observable depends on the selection of one possibility over another.
The bottom line is that cosmic time on any proposal is defined via a
global description that has no bearing on what happens on a small scale.
But it is exactly the processes on the small scale (like the time experiences
of human observers and the evolution of localized systems) that lie at the
basis of the idea that there is objective becoming. The rate of these local
processes is determined by the amount of proper time between events, and
not by differences in cosmic time. For consider local observers in arbitrary
motion with respect to each other and starting from one spacetime point:
proper time differences along their worldlines will not conform to contour
levels of any cosmic time function, due to the non-integrability of proper
time. As a consequence, discrepancies will generally occur in the time lapses
recorded by observers that meet again after having traversed different paths
between two events, as illustrated by the twin effect. However, during their
respective journeys such twins will be able to use the same physics; one
twin ages as fast as the other, as judged by his own clocks. They have the
same time experiences. This empirically verified democracy would be broken
once we started measuring the rate of processes by some ‘true’ global time.
Accordingly, global time—if it can be defined at all—is unrelated to our
experience of becoming. Proper times are the quantities we use in daily life
in our local environment. Cosmic time plays no role on a mundane level.
In summary, what follows from these considerations is that we do not
really need to engage in meditations about other universes. Both according
to special and general relativity, applied to our actual universe, a plausible
global time cannot be defined by reference to what happens on the small scale
of human experience and local physical experiments. Such a global time can
probably be defined through theoretical considerations on the cosmic scale,
but such definitions involve an unavoidable element of arbitrariness, and the
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resulting t is irrelevant to our time experience and the description of local
processes.
4 The block universe and becoming
A global time function, if it exists at all, thus appears to be a theoretical ex-
pedient. It is a helpful tool in the theoretical treatment of spacetimes with a
certain amount of symmetry and is a useful concept in, e.g., the constrained
Hamiltonian formulation of GRT. In the latter context it is comparable to
the choice of a particular gauge in electrodynamics. It does not have con-
sequences on the level of observation (which is local) and a fortiori is not
relevant for our time experience.
However, according to traditional doctrine the existence of a unique series
of global nows is indispensable for what this doctrine considers the essential
difference between space and time, namely that time is ‘dynamic’ whereas
space is ‘static’. The basic idea behind this is that time is objectively pro-
gressing from the past to the future. The history of the universe is unfolding
itself, and this process consists in the successive coming into being of global
nows. This was exactly the notion of time targeted in Go¨del’s attack. Ac-
cordingly, after Go¨del had argued that time cannot be flowing this way, he
concluded that it must be ‘ideal’, by which he meant that our feeling of
becoming does not reflect an objective process of becoming that exists in
physical reality itself, independently of us. Time flow and the associated
difference between space and time must be mind-dependent if there are no
global nows, according to this argument.
This way of reasoning is not at all peculiar to Go¨del’s analysis. That
the absence of a unique succession of universal nows entails that there is no
essential difference between space and time is in fact the basis of a notorious
argument within special relativity. The core of this argument is that with-
out a unique series of nows all events must have their places in spacetime
in the same way as the objects on my desk possess their spatial positions.
All events in the history of the universe should be there ‘together’, ‘at once’.
Put differently, we live in a ‘block universe’ in which all events—past, present
and future—‘exist jointly’. Allegedly, this block view would imply that the
universe is ‘static’, without change and becoming and without fundamental
differences between past, present and future. It is sometimes added that this
blatantly conflicts with our direct experience of temporal change, and that
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this experience must therefore be an illusion. Several versions of this argu-
ment exist in the context of special relativity (compare [18, 20, 15, 16, 17]),
but as we have seen it can be adapted to the situation in general relativity
as well.
There is something deeply puzzling about this argumentation, especially
about any possible ‘illusion part’ of it. As emphasized in the preceding
sections, our time experience—local as it is—does not depend on the concept
of global time. So how then could the denial of the objective existence of
global time lead to a picture that is in conflict with our direct experience?
If there indeed is a mismatch between the block universe and our experience
it must surely come from some other source, not from the absence of global
simultaneity. So let us try to find out whether there actually is something
in the block universe that is at odds with our time experience and whether
it is true that our intuitive notion of time is in conflict with what the block
picture tells us.
This project is hopeless from the outset. It is the purpose of the four-
dimensional spacetime picture, which the block universe is, to represent all
events that actually take place in the universe, complete with all their proper-
ties and mutual relations. An adequate block universe representation there-
fore also contains all events in the lives of individual human beings, with all
the impressions and experiences that (partly) constitute these events. For
example, that I now remember past events and do not yet know much about
what is to come is part of my experience at this instant of my life and should
be part of the four-dimensional picture; the same applies to my conviction
that exactly now it is now. All actual events, experiences and intuitions must
be there in the block representation, exactly at the spacetime position where
they actually occur. So there cannot be any conflict between experience and
the block universe. More generally, since all actual events in the history
of the universe are faithfully represented, with all their characteristics and
mutual relations, there cannot be anything missing in the four-dimensional
picture at all.
This latter conclusion is of course independent of whether or not global
simultaneity exists. If objective global time does exist, this can and should
be represented in the block representation. If it does not exist, it is not
represented in the block. In both cases the block representation does not
need to leave anything out of consideration. But the question of course
remains whether the absence of global simultaneity implies anything for the
difference between space and time, and for the viability of the notion of
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becoming.
Since everything that we experienced, are experiencing and will expe-
rience is represented in the four-dimensional block, quite independently of
whether or not there is global simultaneity, all experiential differences be-
tween space and time are also there. Is there any reason to maintain that
in the case of lacking global simultaneity these experienced differences must
have the status of illusions whereas they may refer to something real if there
is global time? I can see no justification at all for this position. As ar-
gued above, our experiences are local in character and independent of global
simultaneity—they do therefore not lend support to the hypothesis that
global temporal distinctions exist in reality. A theory about the nature of
reality according to which there is global becoming transcends direct experi-
ence much more than any interpretation that stays on the local level. There
is consequently no reason to think that the temporal differences we experi-
ence can only refer to something global. Consequently, if it turns out to be
possible to develop a view of reality in which there is becoming and a dif-
ference between space and time in a local way, the resulting conception will
have every chance of being better supported than rivals postulating global
becoming.
To start with, let us have a closer look at what the doctrine of global be-
coming precisely consists in. The global aspect is that the supposed temporal
ordering extends over the whole universe. But becoming itself is not implied
by the existence of an ordering, whether it is global or not—a stack of papers
is linearly ordered but surely the papers do not come into successive exis-
tence by virtue of this. So independent of the question of temporal ordering,
an analysis of becoming tout court has to be supplied. As I have argued,
any such analysis will apply a fortiori, with better support, to a doctrine of
local becoming. Sense must be made of the notion of the becoming of events
in any case, both in order to get the global and the local doctrines off the
ground.
Now, the four-dimensional spacetime diagram records events with their
qualities and relations. But in order to be recordable at all, the events
in question must occur. They must happen. It is exactly here that there
is room for ‘coming into being’ in the block universe. Events come into
being by occurring, by happening; what else could there coming into being
be? Since non-occurring events are evidently not represented in the four-
dimensional picture, events can only be part of the block universe if they
in fact come into being at their own spacetime location. Their coming into
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being is a precondition for their being part of the block universe. In the block
picture it is recorded for each actual event that, and where/when it occurs.
The specification of the coordinates of an event document first of all that it
happens; all represented events actually happen. Thus, our proposal is that
‘coming into being’ means the same thing as ‘happening’. Since everything
that happens is recorded in the block universe diagram, ‘coming into being’
is also fully represented. There is no need to augment the block universe in
any way.
This proposal boils down to a deflationary analysis of becoming: becom-
ing is nothing but the happening of events, in their temporal order. This
obviously requires some ordering structure in the space of events. However,
there is no need that this is a total linear ordering. In fact, relativity theory
tells us that there is a different temporal ordering in reality, namely the par-
tial ordering induced by the lightcones. Each event is later than the events
in its past lightcone, earlier than the events in its future lightcone, and not
temporally ordered with respect to events outside these two lightcones. This
ordering structure (a partial ordering) can without difficulty be applied to
define becoming. The total pattern of relativistic temporal ordering relations
in the block universe accordingly represents how events come into being with
respect to each other. Given any event, some other events come into being
later or earlier, and still other events—those at spacelike separation—come
into being without being earlier or later than the given event. In particular,
the successive happening of events along a worldline implements the notion
of ‘becoming’ with respect to an object or causal process.
One may object that the mere ordering with respect to each other of
localized events is not sufficient to justify a notion of becoming, though.
Events can be spatially ordered as well, and this does not lead to spatial
becoming (from left to right, for example). So we still have to assume that
there is a difference between space and time that makes it possible to reserve
the label ‘becoming’ to temporal succession. We do not need to come up
with something new here, however: spacetime physics indeed makes such a
distinction. There is an objective difference between spacelike and timelike
vectors; this relates to the fact that space and time are treated differently in
the expression for he metric (in local Lorentz coordinates the metric tensor
has one −1, for the temporal dimension, and three times +1 for the spatial
ones). Given the objective distinction between spatial and temporal ordering,
that events happen or occur and are not just spatially juxtaposed can be
seen as a sui generis attribute of events. The block picture is complete in
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its representation of this becoming: it contains all information about exactly
which events occur, where and when this happens, and in which temporal
order.
Still, one may feel the need for a deeper explanation of what ‘temporality’
and ‘coming into being’ exactly consist in. Indeed, the four-dimensional pic-
ture only tells us that events occur and that they have certain spatiotemporal
relations between them. It only gives us a structural description of the web
of events; does this exhaust the essence of becoming? To counter this request
for explanation, it should be noted that the same thing may be asked with
respect to spatiality. ‘Being something spatial’ is a quality whose content is
not fixed by saying that it belongs to elements possessing the interrelations
of the points of the Euclidean plane. A picture of a plane only represents
structural properties, in the same way as the four-dimensional block universe
picture; and it can be applied to very different entities that happen to ex-
emplify the same structure. To fix the reference to spatial things something
additional must be invoked. A natural move to make is to embed ourselves
in the network of relations, and to identify some of the experiential relations
between ourselves and the world around us as spatial. The same manoeuver
can be carried out in the spatiotemporal context: then the relevant experi-
ences will partly refer to ‘becoming’. If we do not want to invoke experience
in this way, both ‘spatial position’ and ‘occurrence’ must be regarded as sui
generis attributes—of objects and events, respectively.
So according to this proposal, ‘coming into being at (x, t)’ is what it
means to be an event at (x, t). The four-dimensional picture represents the
relations between events, but does not explain further what events are. In
order that a spacetime diagram is acceptable to us as a representation of the
universe, we already have to know what events are, by acquaintance with
them via other means than the contemplation of such representations. That
events happen is something we should already know. We should not become
confused, of course, by the fact that a concrete representation before our
eyes is itself very different from what is represents, namely the events in the
history of the universe. If a spacetime diagram is on a sheet of paper, it is
itself part of the events in the life of the paper, and happening in that sense.
But this is different from the happening of the events represented in the
diagram. The fact that the block diagram itself at any instant is perceived
as purely spatial and does not ‘flow’ is irrelevant for the status of what is
being depicted.
So ‘coming into being’, ‘happening’, ‘taking place’, ‘occurring’, are what
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it is for an event to be an event—it is a primitive concept that cannot be
defined by means of more basic notions. This suggestion seems to be close
to the analysis of ‘becoming’ put forward by Savitt [21] and Dorato [6].
5 Conclusion: local becoming
Becoming thus consists in the successive coming into being of events. This
does not require a global notion of time as in Go¨del’s “infinity of layers of
‘now’ which come into existence successively”. Our direct time experience
does not impose such a total ordering on becoming, and the special theory
of relativity has made us already accustomed to the idea that events pos-
sess only a partial temporal ordering. Since our experience does not tell us
anything about temporal ordering that goes beyond this special relativistic
ordering (induced by the light cone structure), it is natural to be led by the
characteristics of this partial ordering structure in our theorizing about the
characteristics of objective becoming. So the natural view is that the history
of our universe is realized by events that come into being; and that they come
into being after and before each other as dictated by the partial ordering re-
lation induced by the spacetime structure [4]. According to this proposal the
life of the universe is not one linear series of events, but a partially ordered
set of events. The process of becoming is local in two respects: first of all and
most importantly, the focus of becoming are the local events that come into
being; and, second, the ordering relations that govern the temporal relations
in this network of happenings are not global in character. The resulting pic-
ture is in accordance with what relativity theory tells us about the structure
of spacetime and the role of time in it: it captures the ‘many-fingered’ aspect
of time. It accords with our direct time experience as well. It thus provides
us with a scientifically informed notion of becoming.
What has just been said presupposed that an unambiguous temporal
ordering indeed exists. But this condition is not fulfilled in all solutions
of the Einstein equations: in Go¨del-like universes ambiguities arise about
the temporal order of events. This may be countered by declaring such
models unphysical—we have encountered this move before and argued that
it may possess a certain plausibility. But another and I think better possible
response is to say that ‘happening’ or ‘occurring’ of events is the essential
thing, and that whether or not a consistent large-scale ordering is possible




Figure 2: Becoming along an almost closed worldline.
local becoming can be accommodated in all models of general relativity, even
in universes with a complicated Go¨del-like temporal ordering structure.
To see what this may result in, and how this contrasts with other analyses
of ‘becoming’, consider the following example from Reichenbach’s Philosophy
of Space and Time [19, pp. 141-142]; see Figure 2. Worldlines I and II in the
figure represent human beings; worldline II returns to the neighborhood of
one of its earlier points, Go¨del-style. Reichenbach describes the experiences
of the individual associated with worldline II as follows: “Some day you
meet a man who claims that you are his earlier self... Years later you meet
a younger man whom you suddenly recognize as your earlier self... You also
see your former companion again, exactly as old as he was when you last saw
him...He denies any acquaintance with you and agrees with your younger
self that you must be insane. After this encounter, however, you walk along
with him. Your younger self disappears from sight and from then on you
lead a normal life.” Reichenbach goes on to conclude that the following must
be true in universes with almost closed worldlines: “On the same world-line
there would be periodic ‘now-points’ one after the other. In region R we
would find two now-points of the same worldline in causal interaction; and
under these circumstances we would lose the possibility of conceiving of the
self as one identical individual in the course of time. There would be on this
worldline a succession of new individuals who would travel the worldline at
certain intervals. On worldline I we must also mark off such periods...”.
Reichenbach is obviously thinking here in terms of a process of objective
becoming that is progressing along the two worldlines. The way he represents
this may at first sight seem plausible: he assumes that becoming consists in
the motion of a ‘now-point’ along the worldlines. This same idea can be found
in the work of many authors.7 This conception is completely different from
7The famous words of Hermann Weyl, “The objective world simply is, it does not hap-
pen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling upward along the life line of my body,
does a certain section of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which contin-
uously changes in time” [26, p. 116], expresses the same intuition: the four-dimensional
continuum needs the addition of a moving focus, this time that of consciousness, in order
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the one put forward in this paper and it is important to be clear about the
difference. The ‘moving now’ approach requires the addition of something
to the four-dimensional continuum, namely a moving very narrow ‘window’
through which a small portion of the continuum is made visible (or ‘real’).
By contrast, what we have proposed here is a conception according to which
nothing has to be added to the spacetime diagram: the four-dimensional
picture already contains becoming. In Reichenbach’s example the relevant
processes of becoming are the successive happening of events along the two
worldlines.
The ‘moving now conception’ leads to the well-known conundrum of how
fast, and as a function of what, the ‘now’ changes its position. Motion, in
the ordinary sense of the term, means different positions at different times
and this kind of motion is already fully represented in the block picture as it
is. The motion of the added ‘now’ is apparently a completely new concept,
and we are at a loss to explain what it is. But as we will see, in the example
at hand the implausibility of the whole approach becomes even clearer, pace
Reichenbach. This observation will lend further support to the view that
becoming does not reside in something to be added to the block universe—it
is already there.
When the individual of worldline II talks to his younger (or older) self, the
‘now’ conception employed by Reichenbach says that both persons actually
exist and must therefore be ‘touched’ by a now-point (because the ‘now’
identifies the points on the worldlines that are actual). So there must be two
now-points in region R, which both are travelling up the worldline. But when
the younger person now reaches R for the second time, the story repeats
itself, so that a third now-point becomes necessary, and so on. Because
actualized points on worldline I are in contact with actualized points on II,
this multiplicity of now-points carries over to worldline I. So un unending
sequence of now-points travel up the two worldlines, repeating the same
history over and over again; the same events keep on happening and there no
longer is a unique connection between a worldline and an object or individual.
This appears a reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine of the shifting now.
Indeed, the very idea of an event is that it occurs exactly once, namely at
its own spacetime position; and the idea of the four-dimensional spacetime
picture is that it fully contains the history of the whole universe, not an
infinity of indistinguishable repeated histories. At the very least one should
to accommodate the notion of becoming.
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say that an infinite multiplication of entities as necessitated by the moving
now doctrine is a highly undesirable piece of metaphysics.
On our construal of becoming no such absurdities arise. Each event comes
into being only once, at its spacetime position in the four-dimensional world.
Along the two worldlines there is a linear temporal ordering, and therefore
ordinary becoming. When the stroller converses with his younger self, he
is in causal contact with an event that happened long ago in his own life,
i.e., if measured along worldline II, but that is recent if measured along
a different path. This is a direct consequence of the absence of a unique
temporal ordering in the network of occurrences (as is to be expected in
Go¨del-type universes), but entails nothing about a periodicity in the process
of becoming, let alone about a multiplicity of personalities. It seems clear
that this sober account is to be preferred over an account according to which
a mysterious ‘now’ travels through spacetime in an incomprehensible way
while doing something unintelligible over and over again to events on its
way.
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